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PHENOMENOLOGICAL EMPIRICISM
abstract
The aim of this paper is to compare Phenomenological Empiricism with two different kinds of Empiricism: 
Classical Empiricism (represented by Hume) and Logical Empiricism (represented by Schlick). 
Phenomenological Empiricism is at the same time a radical and sophisticated theory of experience, in 
which intentionality, ideation, material a priori, a complex notion of data and of intuition play a crucial 
role.
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL EMPIRICISM
The aim of this paper is to show how Phenomenology is a radical and at the same time 
complex (anti-reductionist) Empiricism. To this end, I will underline similarities and 
differences between Phenomenological Empiricism and other forms of Empiricism. I will 
consider in particular two important kinds of empiricism: Classical Empiricism and Logical 
Empiricism. A third and very important type of empiricism is the so-called Neutral Empiricism 
(that of James, Mach and also, I believe, Bergson). This paper will be limited in scope to the 
examination of the first two kinds of empiricism.1 
First of all, two preliminary questions. What do we mean by the expression “radical 
empiricism”? And in what ways can Phenomenology be considered a radical (even if 
sophisticated) kind of empiricism? 
In a radical empiricism it all begins and ends in the field of Experience. Husserl says:
It must always be borne in mind here that whatever physical things are – the only physical 
things about which we can make statements, the only ones about the being or non-
being, the being-thus or being-otherwise of which we can disagree and make rational 
decisions – they are as experienceable physical things. It is experience alone that prescribes 
their sense; and, since we are speaking of physical things in fact, it is actual experience 
alone which does so in its definitely ordered experiential concatenations.2 
In a radical empiricism, being misled or deceiving oneself also falls within the range of 
phenomena.
As Husserl says:
I may be deceived as to the existence of the object of perception, but not as to the fact 
that I do perceived it as determined in this or that way, that my percept’s target is not 
some totally different object, a pine-tree, e.g., instead of a cockchafer. The self-evidence 
in characterizing description (or in identification and distinction of intentional objects) 
has, no doubt, its understandable limits, but it is true and genuine self-evidence.3 
1  For the relationships between phenomenology and neutral pragmatism see Lanfredini (2017). 
2  See Husserl, 1983, p. 86.
3  Husserl, 2001, p. 297.
1. Radical 
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Husserl’s position, however, should not be confused with the Cartesian videre videor. According 
to Descartes, I could be deceived about what I see, but not about the fact that I am seeing it 
now. More radically, according to the so called static version of phenomenological empiricism, 
it is inappropriate to talk about deception not only from a noetic point of view (seeing 
something) but also from a noematic point of view (what I see). 
I think that, against the so-called West Cost Interpretation4 (and in favour of Gurwitsch5), 
Husserl never proposed a realistic design of intentionality in a metaphysical sense. The 
principle by which objects that are not intended are not given is a principle of phenomenology 
with no exceptions. In a descriptive context this refers us back to the impossibility of making 
an object-based analysis without connecting it with some form of experience. In other 
words, in the phenomenological object there is always contained (from an ontological point 
of view) the reference to a state of consciousness: the red I detect necessarily leads back to 
a determined sensation of redness; the chair I see necessarily leads back to a determined 
perception of that chair; the thought property necessarily leads back to a determined modality 
of thought, and so on. 
Any phenomenon, in order to be such (that is, to become manifest) necessarily leads back to 
an intentional Erlebnis. The necessity, contained in the structure of the phenomenon, of the 
reference to a state of consciousness allows the limit of Phenomenological Ontology to be 
defined. 
This is one of the main differences with respect to Hume’s empiricism. The phenomenological 
notion of data includes directness but not simplicity, even in fundamental elements such 
as sensations. The phenomenological notion of data goes beyond the amorphous and 
undiversified notion of idea to embrace a bi-polar concept of experience composed by a noetic 
pole and a noematic pole. According to Hume, and also Berkeley and Locke, a distinction 
between feeling and felt property, hyletic data and objectual data does not exist. According to 
Husserl, on the contrary, this distinction is absolutely fundamental. 
The fact that for Husserl (contra Hume) the intended object may not effectively be contained 
within the state of consciousness (the singer’s song, says Husserl, is distinct from the act 
of singing), while still being essentially bound to it (there can be no song whose singer can 
dispense with the act of singing), entails a distinction between two ontological dimensions: the 
dimension relating to subjective or noetic object (states of consciousness) and the dimension 
relating to real, objectual, or intended object. 
These environments delimit two distinct but not separated regions: the first region, the 
noetic, which consists of adequate, non-perspectival objects (those given in a complete 
manner and “without residues”, so to speak - eg. seeing a red spot, hearing the sound of violin, 
imaginings the god Jupiter); the second region, the noematic, which consists of objects that 
are inadequate, incomplete, essential perspectival and unilateral (eg. the red spot that is 
seen, the sound of the violin, the imagined god Jupiter). This distinction isolates domains of 
objects which, although ontologically distinct, are nevertheless connected by an essential and 
necessary relationship of unilateral foundation6. In this sense, phenomenological analysis (at 
least from a static point of view) is technically correlative.
In Husserl’s opinion, Hume had passed right through phenomenology with his eyes closed. The 
first blindness consists in its denial of transcendence. Phenomenological transcendence is not 
4  See Føllesdal, 1969, 1982; Dreyfus, 1979, McCulloch, 2003.
5  See Gurwitsch, 1967.
6  See Husserl, 2001, §16.
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an absolute but a relative one: that is, relative to the state of consciousness that constitutes it. 
The expression “phenomenological transcendence” consists of two essential conditions: first, 
the intended object is not effectively contained within the act which intends it; and second, 
the intended object refers in an essential manner to an act that intends it. 
The first condition confirms the reality of the object, the second denies its absolute, or 
metaphysical, reality. So, existence is not a property of the object in itself, but a property of 
the act that intends the object: when we say that an object exists we are in reality asserting 
that the object is understood as existing; that is, we are using a specific modality, a thetic 
or positioning character. In perception, as in memory, unlike in fantasy or in imagination, 
the object appears as existing. Conceived in this way, “authentic” perception, so to speak, 
is no different from hallucination, as far as content or description are concerned. Indeed, 
hallucinatory perception benefits from a positioning character just as much as other 
perceptions do, and as a consequence the hallucinated object appears to us in flesh and blood 
just like any other perceived object (contrary, for example, to what is maintained in Searle).7
The “reality” of the authentic object of perception lies in a sort of operative and contextual 
attitude. So, the materiality of things depends upon the circumstances and the context in 
which they are placed. If we consider a thing by itself, distinguishing between something and 
its phantom – i.e. its pale, empty, and ghostly counterpart – becomes virtually impossible. 
The ghost of a certain thing has all the essential features that render that thing exactly what 
it is and nothing else: essential features that are dispersed throughout an extension. In this 
sense, we would see rainbows and blue skies but we could not define them as material things. 
On the other hand, if we consider the thing within a given context, the thing and the ghost 
of that thing cannot be regarded as the same element. Things exist, are real, substantial, and 
causal (these terms are all synonyms) when they behave in a certain way. In this sense, real (or 
material) properties are, ipso facto, functional links: for example, causal links. In order to get to 
know the reality of a given thing, we must be able to predict its behavior under a certain force, 
pressure, when it is smashed up, cooled down, heated up and so on. In the multiplicity of its 
dependence relations the real thing will retain its own identity.
The possibility of the thing in itself turns out, in conclusion, to be decisively denied by Husserl 
exactly as by Hume. An object that cannot be intended in principle is in fact an effective 
absurdity. But Husserl’s criticism is more sophisticated than Hume’s. Husserl admits that a 
thing in itself is not a matter of non-sense, hence of a contradiction. Asserting the existence 
of a thing in itself does not in fact mean violating any formal law (such as seems to happen in 
cases of syntactical nonsense such as “the tree is and” or semantic nonsense such as “round 
square”). 
The hypothetical assumption of something real outside this world is, of course, 
logically possible; obviously it involves no formal contradiction. (…) When that is 
taken into account the formal-logical possibility of realities outside the world, the one 
spatiotemporal world, which is fixed by our actual experience, materially proves to be a 
countersense.8 
On the other hand, the absurdity of the thing in itself cannot be ascribed to material counter-
sense (that violation which we encounter in examples such as “color without extension”). 
7  See Searle, 2012.
8  Husserl, 1983, pp.108-9.
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The absurdity of the thing in itself seems to reside in a third order of reasons, which we could 
call motivational, according to which, in order for an object to be given, it must exhibit a 
rootedness in an actual experience. And this is the case for the thing in itself, which turns out 
to be impossible not because formally nonsensical, nor because it is materially counter-sense, 
but because it does not have in principle a bond of motivational synthesis with an actual 
experience. In the absence of such a chain of connections in experience, the object vanishes. 
A world outside our world is a concrete absurdity. There are two obligations which the 
notion of world must satisfy so as not to fall into concrete absurdity. The first is that any 
given phenomenon must effectively contain within it the reference to an experience. The 
second, which constitutes the foundation of so-called genetic phenomenology, is that any 
phenomenology, in order to be configured as such, must exhibit an original nexus (however 
remote) with an actual experience, with the acknowledgement of an object in flesh and blood. 
The thing in itself violates both these conditions (the first formal, the second material): on the 
one hand it is a thing which in principle severs the intentional nexus (which any object must 
satisfy in order to be declared as such); on the other it negates that rootedness in a concrete 
experience. 
In conclusion: making reference to a world outside our world, hence to the thing in itself, does 
not entail either the violation of the purely material ontological law according to which two 
types which are founded one on the other are in fact separate (as in the case of color and 
extension), nor the violation of the purely formal ontological law by which two disconnected 
species cannot live within the same singularity (as in the case of the square and the round). 
In the thing in itself, we are in fact witnessing the violation of a further, still more 
fundamental law, the law by which the notion of thing necessarily contains the reference 
to lived experience. If we conceive the two objects of object and experience as unconnected 
categories linked by a relationship of unilateral foundation, the expression “thing in itself” 
expresses a counter-sense that is both formal and material. We can talk about constitutive and 
concrete absurdity. The thing in itself is a constitutive (formal) absurdity because it makes 
reference to something that contains the reference to a constitutive function and at the same 
time removes itself from it. Therefore it is not possible, for constitutive-formal reasons, to 
refer coherently to a thing in itself, simply because the thing in itself is not something, or, 
which is the same, it is a non-thing. Although not senseless, the thing in itself is impossible 
since it violates the formal law by which the notion of thing, containing in itself the reference 
to a corresponding intention, cannot at the same time free itself from such a reference. For 
this reason it turns out, though certainly in a different acceptation from syntactical and 
semantic senselessness, to be unthinkable and not merely imperceptible and unimaginable, as 
happens in purely formal and purely material counter-sense.
The thing in itself is at the same time a concrete (material) absurdity because it is not rooted 
in any original and lived experience. Therefore, it is not possible, for material reasons, to refer 
consistently to a thing in itself, because it is not available.
Hume’s second blindness rests in his negation of the essential, eidetic dimension of experience. 
As is well known, Husserl’s theory supports an ideative notion of data, against the empiricist 
theory of abstraction (see in particular the attention theory (Mill), the representational theory 
(Locke, Berkeley) and the theory of distinctio rationis (Hume)). At the same time Husserl claims 
a material and not formal conception of data (contra Cassirer). I think that the ideative notion 
of data not only is not in contradiction with phenomenological empiricism, but completely 
corroborates it. The event, being invariant, requires ideation; for example, invariant to 
variations of lighting conditions, changes in positions, and so on. Data, being invariant, are not 
without structure. Phenomenological ideation has the following characteristics. First, it is not 
4. Form and 
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an abstraction: it does not function by means of exclusion or negation of some characteristics 
for the benefit of another and it is not founded on any recording of similarities (contra Hume 
and Classical Empiricism). Second, it is not a concept: it does not function by means of 
categorization. There is no need of a good theory of concept constitution for a good theory of 
data (contra Kant). Third, it is not formal: it is not a functional but a material process: that is, a 
process founded on specific features of experience (contra Cassirer).
That last statement introduces the second point that I intend to address: the relationships 
between Phenomenological Empiricism and Logical Empiricism, respectively an empiricism 
with and without intuition.9 
A crucial question for Schlick, as well as for Logical empiricism in general, is the total 
insignificance of the concept of content (in particular, intuitive content) for both a theory 
and a practice of knowledge. Besides, it is this thesis (related to a notable distinction between 
Kennen and Erkennen) which marks – on Schlick’s explicit admission – his radical divergence 
from Husserl. 
According to Schlick the content is inexpressible and indescribable: that is, linguistically 
untouchable: “the difference between structure and material, between form and content is, 
roughly speaking, the difference between that which can be expressed and that which cannot 
be expressed”.10
Let’s consider the famous example, in Schlick, of a person who is born blind. This example 
is perfectly analogous to Husserl’s example (contained in The Idea of Phenomenology11) of the 
deaf man. Let’s consider the perception of green and look at the ineffable quality of green 
which makes the essence of the content. This quality is accessible only to beings endowed 
with eyesight and power of color perception; it couldn’t possibly be conveyed to a person born 
blind. Shall we conclude, Schlick asks, that such a person could not understanding any of our 
statements about color, that they must be quite meaningless to him because he can never 
possess the green content? Schlick’s answer to this question is no. We can communicate to the 
person born blind, as we can to a person who can see, the meaning of “green”. Nevertheless 
what we communicate is not the content – the greenness: “since content is incommunicable by 
language, it cannot be conveyed to a seeing man any more or any better than to a blind one”.12 
What can be communicated (or, which is for Schlick the same, expressed) is the fact that 
something exists – which we call green – and that it is something possessing a certain 
structure or belonging to a certain system of internal relationships. 
I can give a particular description of this green leaf lying on my desk by placing the color in 
a certain order. I assert, for instance, that is a bright green, or a rich green, or a bluish green, 
trying to describe the green by compare it to other colors. Evidently it belongs to the intrinsic 
nature of our green that it occupies a definite position in a range of colors and in a scale of 
brightness, and this position is determined by relations of similarity and dissimilarity to the 
other elements, in this case shades, of the whole system. In this sense, quality, every quality, 
has a certain definite logical structure: “in this way every quality (for instance, the qualities of 
sensation: sound, smell, heat, etc., as well as color) is interconnected with all others by internal 
relations which determine its place in the system of qualities”.13 
In such a perspective the difference between a color-blind person and a normal one is 
existentially relevant but philosophically limited. Both are knowing the same thing. And both 
9  I have addressed this issue in more details in Lanfredini, 2003.
10  Schlick, 1938, p. 291.
11  Husserl, 1966.
12  Husserl, 1966, p. 295.
13  Husserl, 1966, p. 294.
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are not knowing the same thing. Both know the structure in which the green is placed and its 
position in the color spectrum. But, according to Schlick, both do not know the content of the 
green. The only difference between the two consists in their ability to enjoy (or not enjoy) the 
green color. This is absolutely important as far as actual life is concerned, but just as absolutely 
irrelevant for the knowledge of color. 
Schlick says:
I can perceive a green leaf; I say that I perceived it if (among other things) the content 
“green” is there, but it would be nonsense to say that I perceive this content.14 
The content, in the sense of intuitive content, is simply there. The verb used by Schlick in this 
regard is “enjoying”, the nearest equivalent to the German “Erleben”. 
Schlick says again:
Here we uncover the great error committed by the philosophy of intuition: the 
confusion of acquaintance (Kennen) with knowledge (Erkennen).15 
So, Schlick claims a sort of epistemological (although not-ontological) eliminativism, very 
similar to that held by Churchland, according to which the qualitative element is irreducibly 
outside of an adequate theory of knowledge. When I look at the blue sky and lose myself 
entirely in the contemplation of it without thinking, then I am enjoying the blue, I am in a 
state of pure intuition. The blue fills my consciousness completely. But that does not mean 
knowing what blue really is. The Meaning of the word “blue” is entirely included in the 
structure of the intuitive content.
In The idea of Phenomenology Husserl’s example is perfectly analogous to Schlick’s, with 
respect to a person born deaf. A person born deaf knows that sounds exist, and sounds make 
harmonies. But he cannot understand how sounds do this, how symphonies are possible. 
He cannot represent a thing of that kind, he cannot perceive it; and perceiving it he can’t 
understand the how. No kind of physical or psychological theory about color can add anything 
to this “pure vision” which, according to Husserl, establishes the sense of color. 
This thesis presents, from a phenomenological point of view, at least two problems. First, the 
necessity of an intuitive content for the determination of the empirical knowledge. Second, 
the necessity of an intuitive content for the configuration of the same structure. 
Without intuition it is not possible to intend determined objects. According to Husserl, 
determination comes with the fulfillment of an empty intention. Without an intuitive act, by 
which I mean, a fulfilled act, it is not appropriate to speak about knowledge. So, if confronted 
with a brilliant green leaf, a sighted person and a blind person share the same thing, an empty 
intention aiming at a “pure something”. 
But in no case can a blind person believe himself to know either the leaf or its particular 
green. Knowing something means necessarily to have a fulfilled act, that is an act equipped 
with an intuitive content. Without a full, intuitive content every determined knowledge is 
impossible. And without a full, intuitive content the structure of green (and the structure of 
colors in general) is inscrutable. According to the phenomenological point of view, intuition 
is a necessary condition for knowing something because it is a necessary condition to have 
14  Schlick, 1974, p. 319.
15  Schlick, 1974, p. 83.
5. Content and 
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a determined intention of something. Knowing the structure of something requires a prior 
experience, and not vice-versa.
In fact, the rigorous separation between Schlick and Husserl can be analyzed further. The 
problem, I think, is to establish what we mean by intuitive content, a concept that has a more 
complex structure than Schlick has supposed. But as we have seen, the concept of living 
does not exhaust the notion of intuition. The distinction between experiencing (erleben) the 
content and apprehending (auffassen) or perceiving a property or an object makes Schlick’s 
treatment more complex. We experience (or enjoy, as Schlick says) acoustic sensations, but 
we hearing (we perceive) the singer’s song. So, contrary to what Schlick says (“when I gaze 
at a red surface, the red is part of the content of my consciousness”16), red is not a part of the 
content of my consciousness. Affirming that content is simply there and simply present means 
advocating a simplistic and undifferentiated vision of the concept of intuition. We experience 
content, but we mean objects that go beyond these contents in the strict sense. 
Another clarification: for Schlick, content (in the sense of intuitive content) has nothing to 
do with knowledge. There is still more: “the most fundamental mistake of philosophy of all 
times”17 is to identify knowledge with immediate awareness or with intuition. But Husserl has 
never identified knowledge and intuition, even if he considers intuition as necessary condition 
for knowledge. When I hear a sound or see a color, it is not with these acts of hearing and 
seeing that I come to understand what a sound or a color is. Knowing and having acquaintance 
with are not at all synonymous even for Husserl. According to Schlick, knowledge is a result 
of an act of comparing, recognizing, naming. According to Husserl, knowledge means to 
recognize, to identify the intended object, too. Nevertheless, this does not mean, as Schlick 
suggests, to differentiate two types of knowledge: one conceptual and one intuitive. On the 
contrary, knowledge is the result of an integration between two components. This is exactly 
the reasoning which makes it possible to in phenomenological terms to distinguish between 
discrimination of something (the result of a simple act of perception) and identification of 
something as such and such (the result of the conjunction of a meaning act and a perceptive 
act). This important distinction does not seem present in Schlick’s perspective. 
Husserl’s analysis is more subtle in comparison with that of Schlick. In fact, he distinguishes 
sensation from perception on the one hand, and perception from conceptual elaboration 
on the other. Perception, for Husserl, is not a judgment; it is not knowing something. The 
distinction marks the important difference between an epistemic conception and a non-
epistemic conception of perception. Husserl accepts the second one; in this sense he corrects 
Kant’s famous principle according to which “intuition without conception is blind, and 
conception without intuition is empty”. While the second part of the affirmation is without 
doubt true, the first needs a correction: it is not the concept that allows intuition to see; 
perception has already, in itself, an organization, a structure which does not have any 
reference to conceptualization. 
Then, according to Husserl, it is not necessary that our consciousness experience acquires 
propositional contents. In particular, conscious experiences can represent something in a 
certain way regardless of inferential or propositional content: that is, regardless of beliefs 
and concepts. Conscious experiences are intrinsically related to a qualitative format (qualia). 
Qualitative states are independent of their descriptive value, so that we can have a conscious 
experience without having a description of something.
16  Schlick, 1938, p. 102.
17  Schlick, 1938, p. 318.
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There is in fact an important distinction between perceptual discrimination (non-
propositional) and perceptual identification (propositional).
Against the so called tracking theories (TT )18 whose main endeavor is to naturalize the content 
of qualitative states by reducing it to tracking relations holding between the phenomenality 
of consciousness and physical properties of environment, Husserl would endorse the so called 
phenomenal intentionality research program (PIT)19. According to PIT, intentionality is basically 
a matter of phenomenal consciousness: any qualitative state has a phenomenal property 
which expresses a specific and determined qualitative state. Furthermore, it is precisely by 
virtue of this richness of phenomenal properties that it is impossible to think about different 
experiences with different propositional content. The propositional content depends on 
phenomenal properties, and not vice versa. If the qualitative spectrum of our experiences 
were not characterized by a plurality of phenomenal properties, it could not be available to a 
propositional format. 
Accordingly, the experience’s propositional content depends in a strong sense on having a 
plurality of phenomenal properties that characterize the experience in itself.20 
In conclusion, the famous distinction between Kennen and Erkennen is not at all denied by 
Husserl. Certainly for Husserl, as for Schlick, Kennen is not knowledge in a proper sense. 
But knowledge needs the Kennen in order to acquire determined knowledge. So, there is a 
crucial difference between the two perspectives. Schlick declares explicitly that “intuition 
and conceptual knowledge do not both strive for the same goal; they move in opposite 
directions”21 . According to Husserl, in contrast, intuition is an integrating part of the genuine 
process of knowledge. Authentic knowledge cannot function without a qualitative factor. To 
determine and consequently to identify a red object, we must have an experience of “what it 
is like” (using Nagel’s expression) to see something red. We have knowledge when we have an 
acknowledgment. But acknowledgment necessarily implies an act of intuition. 
So, I think that the main element of the deep disagreement between Husserl’s empiricism and 
Schlick’s empiricism resides in a different philosophical conception of the notion of intuition 
(and, thus, in the notion of experience). Schlick speaks about intuition as “an exceptionally 
close relation between subject and object”, something mystical and completely inexpressible 
(the borderline case of this is the relation between consciousness and God). But this is a mere 
caricature of the concept of intuition. Intuition has an internal structure. 
 The second difference between Schlick and Husserl resides in the different value that the two 
attribute to the concept of intuition. For Schlick, intuition is radically outside the dimension 
of knowledge; according to Husserl, in contrast, intuition is an integral part of knowledge. 
Without it, no determined knowledge is possible. In this sense, I think that the content 
empiricism advocated by Husserl is more radical than the formal empiricism advocated by 
Schlick. 
In conclusion, phenomenology is a kind of radical empiricism. But it is not a reductionist 
form of empiricism. Husserl’s position has not assimilated to classical Empiricism for these 
reasons. First, the phenomenological notion of data includes directness and immediacy 
but not simplicity. In Classical Empiricism, consciousness is a place, and the objects are 
immanent data: that is, sensations, ideas, perceptions, and so on. For Husserl, consciousness 
18  Dretske, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2003; Millikan, 2009; Papineau, 1987.
19  Kriegel, 2008, 2013.
20  See Zipoli Caiani, 2019.
21  Schlick, 1938, p. 82.
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is, on the contrary, not a closed place, and the object is not inside consciousness, as in a sack. 
Second, the phenomenological notion of data includes reality, even if relative, or, if you will, 
empirical. The phenomenological notion of reality is functional, relational, operative and not 
substantial in any sense of the word. Third, the phenomenological notion of absolute reality is 
an absurdity (as in Hume), but the argument in Husserl is much more sophisticated and more 
fully articulated. Husserl distinguishes different forms of absurdity: nonsense, counter-sense 
and constitutive-motivational (or concrete) absurdity. A reality in itself reflects the last kind of 
absurdity. Finally, the phenomenological notion of data requires an ideative process that fixes 
an invariant to the variations of different conditions. Husserl’s position is profoundly different 
from Logical empiricism for these reasons: a) the phenomenological notion of intuition is 
more elaborated and sophisticated by comparison with that of Schlick. For example, in Husserl 
an important difference exists between discrimination of something and identification of 
something. Both imply intuition, but in a different sense; b) the phenomenological notion of 
intuition is absolutely essential for knowing something. Without intuitive, qualitative content, 
the empirical knowledge is lacking in determination. Moreover, without intuitive, qualitative 
content we cannot set a structure of something; for instance the structure of color, the 
structure of sound, the structure of physical things, and so on.
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